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The insular cortex (IC) is considered a rich hub for context-sensitive emotions/social
cognition. Patients with focal IC stroke provide unique opportunities to study
socio-emotional processes. Nevertheless, Couto et al. (2013b) have recently reported
controversial results regarding IC involvement in emotion and social cognition.
Similarly, patients with similar lesions show high functional variability, ranging from
almost totally preserved to strongly impaired behavior. Critical evidence suggests
that the variability of these patients in the above domains can be explained by
enhanced neuroplasticity, compensatory processes, and functional remapping after
stroke. Therefore, socio-emotional processes would depend on long-distance connections
between the IC and frontotemporal regions. We propose that predictive coding and
effective connectivity represent a novel approach to explore functional connectivity and
assess compensatory, contralateral, and subsidiary network differences among focal
stroke patients. This approach would help explain why socio-emotional performance is
so variable within this population.
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THE INSULA: A RICH HUB FOR SOCIAL COGNITION
The insular cortex (IC), a brain region localized deep in the
lateral sulcus, has been recently considered an interoceptive region
(Penfield and Faulk, 1955; Greenspan et al., 1999; Aziz et al., 2000;
Harper et al., 2000; Cameron and Minoshima, 2002; Craig, 2002;
Critchley et al., 2004). The IC is also regarded as a fundamental
substrate of emotional experience and social cognition (Couto
et al., 2013b). Several studies have examined the role of the IC
in the recognition, experience, and imagination of basic emotions
(Jabbi et al., 2008; Sprengelmeyer et al., 2010), as well as in empa-
thy and social cognition (Bernhardt and Singer, 2012; Decety
et al., 2012a; Koban and Pourtois, 2014). Connectivity measures
have shown anterior IC (aIC) involvement in different networks
subserving cognitive, homeostatic, and socio-emotional processes
(Kelly et al., 2012). For its own part, the right aIC plays an
integrative role in coordinating awareness of body feelings (Craig,
2002), contextual social clues (Amoruso et al., 2011; Bernhardt
and Singer, 2012; Ibañez and Manes, 2012b), and emotional
salient stimuli (Seeley et al., 2007; Ibañez et al., 2010). The IC
role in coordinating emotions and social cognition depends on
a wide arrangement of structural connections. Briefly, regions
ubiquitously activated in social cognition tasks, such as the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC; including the anterior cingulate cortex,
ACC) and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), are connected
with the IC. These regions connect distant modules within the
network and offer links to other functional networks (Liang
et al., 2013; van den Heuvel and Sporns, 2013). Therefore, IC has
been acknowledged as part of a “rich hub” that integrates global
information within the brain (Kelly et al., 2012).
Internal body signaling has been proposed to trigger mod-
ulations of emotional processing and social cognition (Melloni
et al., 2013; Couto et al., 2014; Sedeño et al., 2014; Uddin et al.,
2014). The right aIC has been specifically assumed to redirect
attention in response to emotionally salient stimuli (salience
network/ventral attention system; Fox et al., 2006; Seeley et al.,
2007; Corbetta et al., 2008; Eckert et al., 2009; Menon and
Uddin, 2010; Nelson et al., 2010; Cirneci, 2011). The aIC has
also been implicated in social emotions and social cognition
(Singer et al., 2004; Keysers and Gazzola, 2007; Saarela et al.,
2007; Caruana et al., 2011; Decety et al., 2012b; Ibañez and
Manes, 2012b; Melloni et al., 2014). Patients with frontotemporal
dementia have shown deficits in empathy (Baez et al., 2014b;
see also similar results in early neurodegeneration: Baez et al.,
2013a), moral cognition (Baez et al., 2014a) and mentalizing
processes associated with IC degeneration (Couto et al., 2013a).
In addition, meta-analytic evidence has revealed IC involvement
in non-story-based ToM studies (Mar, 2011). More straightfor-
wardly, several models propose that the contextual association
of environmental and internally driven emotional signals trigger
specific social responses (Decety and Jackson, 2004; Corbetta
et al., 2008; Adolphs, 2009; Lamm et al., 2010; Lamm and
Singer, 2010; Ibañez and Manes, 2012a; Baez and Ibanez, 2014;
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Sedeño et al., 2014). The IC is considered a relay region for
the integration of bottom-up interoceptive/emotional signals and
higher-level regulation of information flow (Ibañez and Manes,
2012a; Gu et al., 2013). In addition, predictive coding offers
a new view of emotion as interoceptive inference (Seth et al.,
2012). In brief, the aIC is a suitable hub to integrate internal
body signals, emotion, and social cognition processes: it conveys
a sense of the organism’s homeostatic status (Craig, 2003) and
is ubiquitously engaged in affective-cognitive networks (Kurth
et al., 2010; Uddin et al., 2014). As previously suggested (Uddin
et al., 2014), the aIC can be considered a critical site for the
integration of internal information with emotional and social
stimuli.
CONTROVERSIES ABOUT INSULAR SPECIFICITY FOR
EMOTION AND SOCIAL COGNITION: LESION STUDIES
Despite the evidence summarized above, data regarding specific
IC involvement in socio-emotional processes are controversial.
Results have been particularly inconsistent in stroke-patient
studies. Patients with focal stroke provide a unique frame-
work to study brain function, as they afford insights into how
crucial an area is fora specific function (Rorden and Karnath,
2004).
Disgust has been related to IC. In this sense, Calder et al.
(2000) and Adolph et al. (Calder et al., 2000; Adolphs et al., 2003)
reported patients with IC damage who showed deficits in both
the recognition and experience of disgust. Such findings support
the role of the insula in the perception of aversive emotions.
Moreover, the right insula is associated with negative emotions in
general, and disgust in particular (Shapira et al., 2003; Sambataro
et al., 2006; Henley et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2009; Ruiz et al., 2013).
Indeed, recognition of disgust requires the integrity of right-
sided structures (Adolphs et al., 2000). With the exception of
some prefrontal areas (Harmon-Jones, 2004), most studies show
a left-side participation in positive emotion impairments, and
right-side involvement in negative emotion deficits (for reviews,
see Adolphs, 2002; Brown et al., 2011). However, Straube et al.
(2010) reported spared disgust recognition and emotion experi-
ence in a patient with a right IC stroke.
Although disgust recognition studies differ in the side of the
lesion (left in Calder’s study and right in Straube’s study), the
right IC (whose lesion did not impair disgust recognition in
Straube’s) is supposed to index negative emotions and disgust,
as reported in several other studies (Adolphs et al., 2000; Shapira
et al., 2003; Sambataro et al., 2006; Henley et al., 2008; Chen et al.,
2009; Ruiz et al., 2013; for reviews, see Adolphs, 2002; Brown
et al., 2011). Thus, stroke evidence regarding disgust recognition
remains controversial; these results call for an explanation of the
impairments’ variability.
Similarly, the IC has been identified as part of a set of
regions implicated in the processing of empathy (Leigh et al.,
2013). Although functional imaging studies consistently show
aIC activation in affective empathy and moral tasks (Bzdok
et al., 2012), temporal lobe lesions (and not only IC lesions)
are frequently associated with impairments in affective empa-
thy. For example, 90% of the patients studied by Leigh et al.
(2013) (all with damage to the IC and the temporal lobe)
presented deficits in affective empathy tasks; and the only
patient with spared affective empathy had damage in the IC
but not in the temporal lobe. One alternative explanation is
that this patient’s lesion was too small to induce an effect.
Despite this possibility, the error rate during task performance
was not directly associated with injured IC volume. For exam-
ple, patients 1 and 7 showed similar error rates although they
featured 77% and 23.6% of insular tissue damage, respectively
presented similar performance; in turn, both patients 9 and
8 presented a 100% error rate, although their insular lesion
involvement was 96% and 0%, respectively. Notably, all patients
with insular lesions that presented impaired empathy also exhib-
ited temporal lesions; in fact, damage to temporal regions (ante-
rior temporal pole, superior temporal gyrus, middle temporal
gyrus) was the best predictor of performance. Therefore, it
appears that IC damage itself does not explain affective empathy
impairments.
Regarding the lateralization of IC in the empathy studies,
several reports have shown a general right predominance (Bodini
et al., 2004; Brüne and Brüne-Cohrs, 2006; Shamay-Tsoory,
2011; Leigh et al., 2013). Both right anterior insula and right
temporal pole atrophy have been associated with impaired affec-
tive empathy in neurodegenerative disease (Rankin et al., 2005;
Kipps and Hodges, 2006; Narvid et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2012).
However, a meta-analysis of previous studies has not found
a specific lateralization of empathy within the insula (Lamm
et al., 2011). In addition, another activation likelihood meta-
analysis of 112 experiments on affective empathy reported a
significant activation in the bilateral anterior insula in association
with empathy tasks across studies (Bzdok et al., 2012). Thus,
a bilateral participation of the insula in empathy is more
expected.
Note, however, that the anatomical position and vascular
supply (i.e., from the middle cerebral artery, MCA) of the
IC renders focal damage extremely infrequent in clinical prac-
tice (Ibañez et al., 2010). For example, Cereda et al. (2002)
reported that out of 4,800 stroke patients only four had a truly
isolated IC infarction. Therefore, it remains unclear whether
the socio-emotional changes observed in stroke patients with
damage to the MCA territory actually stem from focal IC
lesions. The controversial results obtained in lesion studies
might reflect both the relative involvement of focal IC lesions
and the severity of the damage sustained by insular connec-
tions (Ibañez et al., 2010). Incidentally, similar controversies
surround other brain structures. For instance, frontal lobe
patients with similar lesions also show high cognitive variabil-
ity, ranging from almost totally preserved to strongly impaired
performance in multiple domains, including both emotion recog-
nition and social cognition (Mesulam, 1986; Ibañez and Manes,
2012a).
DISENTAGLING THE INSULA FROM ITS CONNECTIONS IN
FOCAL STROKE STUDIES
In a pioneering double case report, Couto et al. (2013b) dis-
tinguished the role of the IC from that of its connections in
social emotions, higher order social cognition, and emotion
recognition (especially, negative emotions and, in particular,
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disgust). The peculiarity of the lesions allowed the authors to
go beyond previous studies. Whereas one subject had a very
rare focal IC lesion (without any subcortical impairment), the
other had a subcortical (striatal) focal stroke affecting the connec-
tions between the IC and frontotemporal regions. Both patients
and a sample of matched controls were administered neuropsy-
chological and affective screening questionnaires, an emotional
inference disambiguation task (using social contextual clues, see
also Baez and Ibanez, 2014), a battery of multimodal basic
emotion recognition tests, an empathy task, and a theory-of-
mind task. The insular lesion patient showed spared emotion
recognition and social emotions (although response times were
delayed in a subset of tasks). Surprisingly, this patient outper-
formed the controls in the prosody test and in recognition of
disgust (the emotion believed to critically depend on the IC).
In these tasks, the patient responded faster and more accurately
than controls. Conversely, the subcortical lesion patient showed
strong impairments in multimodal aversive emotion recognition
(including disgust). The patient also displayed delayed response
times and deficits in empathy and context-driven emotion
inference.
These unexpected results suggest that IC-related networks,
as opposed to the IC itself, are associated with negative emo-
tional processing and social cognition. Thereby, the IC would
play a critical role in the processing of emotion and social
cognition, but only within the context of its frontotemporal
connections. Thus, preserved emotion recognition and social
cognition in insular patients, as well as the report of tran-
sitory post-stroke deficits in empathy and other social cog-
nition domains (Eslinger et al., 2002), may reflect enhanced
neuroplasticity and successful functional remapping of the
IC-frontotemporal network after IC stroke (Couto et al.,
2013b).
Alternatively, the deficits of the subcortical patient could
reflect weakened interoceptive activity in the dorsal poste-
rior insula. Although deficits in interoceptive awareness may
partially explain the patient’s performance, there is evidence
to the contrary. In a subsequent study (Couto et al., under
review), we assessed interoceptive sensitivity in the same two
patients and found that interoceptive-related behavior was dif-
ferentially impaired in each case: the insular lesion affected
cardiac interoceptive measures whereas the subcortical lesion
yielded preserved performance. Thus, the subcortical patient’s
impairments in social cognition and negative emotion can-
not be explained by canonical interoceptive signals running
through autonomous (vagal) pathways. These factors notwith-
standing, further studies would elucidate the relationship between
interoceptive sensitivity and social cognition in subcortical
lesions.
The neuroanatomical and behavioral evidence offered by
Couto et al. (2013b) also suggest that frontotemporal networks
must be spared for intact emotional processing and social cog-
nition (Ibañez and Manes, 2012a; Couto et al., 2013a; Melloni
et al., 2014). Affective and cognitive information may be sent
to the IC via subcortical tracts affording links to other nodes
within the social-emotional network. Therefore, we suggest
that social processes (from inference of emotions to empathy
and moral cognition) depend on IC connections with frontal
and temporal subcortical structures (Baez et al., 2012, 2013b,
2014a,b; Ibañez and Manes, 2012b; Couto et al., 2013a; Ibáñez
et al., 2013; Lavin et al., 2013; Escobar et al., 2014; Melloni
et al., 2014). In this view, the behavioral variability found
in clinical patients may reflect diverse lesions affecting var-
ied loci and their specific directional relations along this vast
network.
A PREDICTIVE CODING FRAMEWORK FOR INSULAR HUBS
The predictive coding approach is gaining acceptance within
the neuroscience community (Friston, 2012). Predictive cod-
ing theory rests upon well-defined principles: The brain is
an inference machine which creates top-down predictions on
the causes of sensory inputs and updates such predictions
via bottom-up prediction errors (PEs, the differences between
actual and expected outcomes). Top-down predictions work
via feedback information that minimizes PEs (Friston and
Kiebel, 2009; Friston et al., 2010). Hierarchical minimization
of PEs constitutes the core of predictive coding. PEs not
minimized at a lower level in the hierarchy (e.g., primary
visual cortex) pass to the next level in the hierarchy (e.g.,
associative areas). The process continues until PEs are com-
pletely minimized (Kiebel et al., 2008; Friston and Kiebel,
2009).
Predictive coding principles apply not only to basic brain
function but also to social cognition (Brown and Brüne, 2012).
Social information would serve modulatory purposes between
bottom-up and top-down information (Brown and Brüne, 2012).
More specifically, the IC has been conceived as a comparator
locus in which interoceptive-related PE could be minimized (Seth
and Critchley, 2013). Thus, interoceptive feeling states (emotions)
can emerge from inferred predictive models of interoceptive
afferents (Seth, 2013). Although this theoretical proposal seems
attractive, it implies a methodological challenge for a suitable
predictive-coding based research program: designing an experi-
mental paradigm capable of generating PE that are not minimized
at lower sensory regions. Put simply, based on the tenets of a hier-
archical minimization process, PE that would be minimized in the
IC must not have been explained away in lower cortical regions.
We are currently working towards the development of such an
experimental paradigm. In sum, predictive coding appears to be a
suitable theoretical and methodological framework to study effec-
tive connectivity between the IC and related regions (Critchley
and Seth, 2012; Seth et al., 2012).
Within the predictive coding approach, we could conceptualize
the fronto-temporo-insular network as a hierarchy of con-
nections. This hierarchy of connections accommodates a
more parsimonious explanation and further hypotheses on
previous bewildering findings. Specifically, the hypothesis that
striatal-insular projections would convey social and affec-
tive information is consistent with the role of PEs and the
hierarchical PE minimization process. PEs associated with
negative emotions, empathy, and affective arousal, are con-
veyed to the IC and more frontal regions (higher in the
hierarchy) by subcortical areas (lower in the hierarchy). PE-
signals affecting the insular region would modulate connections,
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FIGURE 1 | General framework of the hierarchical minimization
process of PEs. Via backward connections, higher cortical areas
convey hypotheses about, for example, the causes of the
interoceptive information to lower cortical or subcortical areas (e.g.,
from the frontal cortex to the IC). Each level of the hierarchy conveys
a specific prediction to the closest lower area in which canonical
intrinsic interactions minimize the difference between the expected
and the actual information (i.e., PE). When PEs are not minimized at a
given level (e.g., in the striatum), they are passed along to the next
level (e.g., the IC) which receives new predictions from the top of the
hierarchy (the frontal cortex). The process continues upstream until
the PEs are completely minimized.
whereas PE-signals targeting more frontal areas would reach
minimization.
The above hypothesis suggests a two-sided explanation of
the behavioral effects reported by Couto et al. On the one
hand, PEs and response times are strongly correlated (Feldman
and Friston, 2010), which would account for the longer
response times yielded by the insular patient when recogniz-
ing emotions. PE-related signals do not directly affect insular
neurons; they modulate connections converging in the insula
(Limongi et al., 2013). Therefore, damaged IC would not affect
negative emotion recognition on the assumption of intact extrin-
sic connections. On the other hand, striatal/temporal lesions
would limit the PE-signals modulating connections which con-
verge in the IC. Moreover, PEs originating in the striatum
would not reach higher regions in the hierarchy. Thus, dam-
age to the striatum and other temporal sites would limit
the PE minimization process. Behaviorally, the performance
in negative emotion recognition would decrease in striatal
patients.
This model (Figure 1) gives rise to distinct predictions regard-
ing differences between insular patients and controls. In the
former population, signals associated with longer response times
would more strongly modulate connections converging in the
IC (e.g., basal ganglia, ACC, orbitofrontal cortex, inferior frontal
gyrus, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex). The preserved con-
tralateral side of the insula would still receive this modulatory
information, but it would process such information less effi-
ciently. Note that the explanations and hypotheses presented in
this section refer to modulatory activity in between-region con-
nections. Testing these hypotheses, therefore, requires methods
beyond conventional functional connectivity (coactivity) analy-
ses typically reported in the neuroscientific literature. One such
method is effective connectivity analysis.
EFFECTIVE CONNECTIVITY AS A NEW APPROACH TO
CHARACTERIZE LESION PATIENT VARIABILITY
Whereas functional connectivity describes coactivity between two
or more brain regions, effective connectivity describes how the
regions connect and how other regions modulate the connections.
Dynamic causal models (DCM; Friston, 2007) comprise a biologi-
cally reliable strategy to specify driving inputs, modulatory inputs,
and between-region connections that give rise to neurophysiolog-
ical data (e.g., hemodynamic and electrophysiological responses).
An innovative translational approach consists in pairing exper-
imental conditions and group-specific covariates with the con-
nections as well as driving and modulatory inputs. By means
of DCM, the researcher can then specify competing hypotheses
on the effects of the conditions/covariates. Optimal parameters
representing the effects can be estimated through bilinear differ-
ential equations. Finally, using Bayesian model selection strategies
(Stephan et al., 2009), the researcher can select the model or
family of models (Penny et al., 2010; Rosa et al., 2012) that best
account for the physiological data.
Social and emotional contexts probably make evident the
largest variability among individuals. Effective connectivity offers
a fine level of sensitivity to account for such variability.
Although other effective connectivity approaches (e.g., inde-
pendent multiple-sample greedy equivalence search (IMaGES;
Ramsey et al., 2010) have been used in the field of social cogni-
tion (Hanson et al., 2013), DCM are more biologically reliable
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to identify interregional connectivity and describe how signals
(such as PE) modulate the connections. If we can estimate which
parameters describe an experimental effect in a control group, we
can also describe the within- and between group variability in our
parameters of interest. Moreover, by comparing parameters val-
ues, we could describe longitudinal effects of clinical, neuropsy-
chological, and pharmacological interventions. We could also
describe how the parameters vary during the evolution of neu-
rodegenerative diseases affecting similar fronto-temporo-insular
connections (e.g., frontotemporal dementia). These strategies
have recently yielded promising results in research on epilepsy
(Daunizeau et al., 2012) and Parkinson’s disease (Kahan et al.,
2012).
CONCLUSIONS
Current descriptions of socio-emotional impairments triggered
by insular stroke (and related frontotemporal lesions) suggest
high variability in the patients’ performance. This variability can
be interpreted in terms of preserved/affected hubs connecting the
lesion sites with other ipsilateral regions and with their contralat-
eral regions. Here, we have proposed that effective connectivity
analysis constitutes a novel approach to examine functional con-
nectivity and explain why only some stroke patients are impaired
in these domains. Specifically, effective connectivity studies allow
us to assess compensatory, contralateral, and subsidiary networks.
Moreover, given the existence of transitory post-stroke deficits
in empathy and other social cognition domains, this approach
may be used to test the functional-remapping hypothesis in cases
of IC damage and similar hypotheses in patients with lesions to
other brain regions. Dynamic causal models of effective connec-
tivity may provide an opportunity to achieve “effective” cross-talk
between clinicians and basic neuroscientists (Kahan and Foltynie,
2013). By means of effective connectivity studies, we may be
able to understand why patients with similar lesions perform
differently (i.e., very well or very badly) in emotional, social, and
cognitive domains.
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